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Social Welfare in East Asia: Low Public
Spending but Low Income Inequality?
“Light” welfare states were perceived by some as one source of East Asian economic
dynamism. Didier Jacobs has examined the strengths of several East Asian social
welfare systems and the challenges they face after the financial crisis.
Japan has a fully-fledged social welfare system. Yet her public spending on welfare is
low compared to the United Kingdom, especially in sectors such as unemployment and
child benefits, housing and personal social services.
South Korea and Taiwan have passed important legislation in the last decade to
strengthen their social welfare systems. Their public expenditures are therefore bound
to rise as their populations age, their old age pension schemes mature and their various
social security benefits are progressively extended to marginal occupational groups.
Hong Kong and Singapore’s public expenditures on welfare are even lower, mainly
because their social security is largely privately financed.
On an income inequality scale, Japan ranks between most continental European
countries and the United Kingdom, together with Korea and Taiwan. Income in
Singapore and Hong Kong is even more unequally distributed than in the United
Kingdom.
Public transfers contribute little to income equality in East Asian countries. On the
other hand, work is more evenly distributed across households. By retaining workers
who are not necessarily profitable, enterprises are playing a major welfare role that
contributes to low income inequality without high public spending. Three-generation
households play a similar role by pooling income between workers and economically
inactive people, with women providing personal care for children and the elderly.
These forms of enterprise and family welfare are currently being challenged, which
may result in increased income inequality. As the state is called upon to fill the gap,
public spending is also likely to grow, as is illustrated by recent measures for the
unemployed in Korea and investment in personal social services in Japan to tackle her
acute ageing problem.
Further Information
A more detailed account of sources and methods can be found in CASEpaper 10, East
Asian Social Welfare: A Comparative Analysis Including Private Welfare, by Didier
Jacobs. Copies are available free of charge from Jane Dickson, CASE, at the address
below, or can be downloaded from our internet site: http://sticerd.lse.ac.uk/Case.
London School of Economics
Houghton Street
London WC2A 2AE
The Welfare States of Five East Asian Countries
Japan, Korea and Taiwan have insurance-based social security systems that are fragmented along
occupational lines (i.e., civil servants, employees and the self-employed each have their own
schemes). While Japan has achieved universal coverage in health care and pensions a long time ago,
Korea and Taiwan have passed legislation to that end during the last decade (i.e., health care in both
countries, pensions in Korea) or are about to do so (i.e., pensions in Taiwan). Social insurance
schemes also cover the risks of invalidity, disability, occupational injuries and unemployment in all
three countries.
In Singapore, the pillar of social security is the Central Provident Fund (CPF). Employees must put
money in individualised accounts, which they may withdraw upon retirement, disability or to pay
for hospital bills or health insurance policies. In Hong Kong, a combination of mandatory severance
pay, non-contributory and non-means-tested allowances and means-tested benefits cover the risks of
old age and disability. In both countries, labour laws also enforce employers to pay minimum
benefits in case of unemployment, sickness and occupational injuries.
Education and health care are provided by a mix of public and private facilities in all countries.
Education is heavily subsidised by the state, although user fees are typically higher than in Western
countries (which is matched by a higher willingness to pay for education, a Confucian heritage).
Health care is almost free in public facilities in Hong Kong, but a large proportion of the population
opts out to the private sector due to poor quality. The other countries partially subsidise health
facilities but health care is mainly financed through insurance schemes or the CPF. A majority of
people live in public housing in Hong Kong and Singapore, although user charges cover most of the
costs. Japan, Korea and Taiwan intervene in the housing sector mainly through regulation, with
limited subsidies and public housing.
The Sources of Low Public Spending on Welfare in East Asia
In Figure 1, East Asian and Western countries are divided into four groups according to their levels
of public spending on welfare as a proportion of GDP (OECD definition). The differences in
spending levels between each group can be explained by several factors:
• Private finance: Hong Kong and Singapore heavily rely upon privately financed social security
instruments (i.e., provident fund and labour laws).
• Generosity: Some schemes have fairly low income replacement rates, such as Hong Kong and
Taiwan’s old age pensions. Korean and Taiwanese health insurance schemes also involve high
user fees. Japanese benefits may be considered as less generous than those of some European
countries.
• Demography: Young populations imply low needs in the retirement and health care sectors.
While the proportion of the elderly is already as high in Japan as in many Western countries
(and still growing faster), it is much lower in the other four countries.
• Coverage: Some occupational groups representing large numbers of people are not covered by
any insurance for some social risks, especially in Korea but less so in Japan.
• Maturity: Spending on retirement pensions reflects past contributions, which are typically low
for recently introduced schemes (e.g., Korea’s National Pension Programme).
• Marginal sectors: 91% of Japan’s total welfare spending is devoted to the three main sectors of
education, health care and retirement pensions, compared to only 63% in the United Kingdom.
In other words, spending on sectors such as unemployment and child benefits, housing and
personal services are relatively low in Japan, as well as in the other East Asian countries.
Sources: OECD and national sources for non-OECD members (variations of up to 25% may exist between different
sources).
Notes: Includes education, health care, social security, housing and personal social services. Various years (1990s)
The Sources of Income (In)equality in East Asia
There is some controversy about income
distribution in Japan, due to the existence of two
national surveys yielding quite different results.
According to the least biased survey, Japan ranks
between continental European countries and the
United Kingdom, together with Taiwan and Korea
(see Table 1). Hong Kong and Singapore are much
more unequal societies.
Figure 2 highlights the main factors affecting the
distribution of household disposable income and
contrasts Japan, Korea and Taiwan with Western
countries. On the one hand, the redistributive power
of public transfers is weak in the East Asian
countries. On the other hand, their distribution of
household income before public transfers is
relatively more equal. This is mainly due to the
relatively even distribution of work across
households. The ranking of Japan on a scale of
individual earnings inequality is indeed almost the
same as that of household disposable income
presented in Table 1.
Figure 2 also shows the major causes of those differences. Most social security schemes in Japan,
Korea and Taiwan offer earnings-related benefits that involve very little redistribution between rich
and poor. The fragmentation of social security between occupational groups also limits
redistribution from high-earnings groups (e.g., employees of large enterprises) to low-earnings
groups (e.g., farmers), despite the existence of limited transfers between schemes. The application
of tests of means to extended families rather than households further limits the redistributive role of
Figure 1: Total public spending on social welfare 
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Table 1: Gini coefficients of
household disposable income
Definition 1 Definition 2
Sweden
Germany
France
Taiwan
Japan
Korea
UK
USA
Hong Kong
Singapore
0.23
0.26
0.29
0.30
0.32
..
0.34
0.34
..
..
0.28
0.32
0.35
0.31
0.28
0.33
0.39
0.36
0.39
0.42
Sources: Luxembourg Income Study (definition
1) and national sources (definition 2). Japan: 2
different national sources.
Notes: In definition 1, income is equivalised for
household size, not in definition 2. Various years
(1980s and 1990s).
the state. As to the distribution of work across households, it is more equal in East Asian countries
because of the relatively low proportion of elderly people (except in Japan), the low unemployment
rates, the high labour force participation rates of the elderly and the high proportion of elderly and
youths living with their children and parents respectively.
Figure 2: Structure of household disposable income distribution in Japan, Korea and Taiwan
compared to Western countries
The Importance of Enterprise and Family Welfare in East Asia and the Challenges
they Face
It is not true that welfare benefits voluntarily paid by enterprises compensate for the relatively low
public spending in Japan, because voluntary non-wage labour costs are about as high in many
Western countries. However, Japanese (and to a lesser extent, Korean) enterprises do play a major
welfare role by retaining workers who are not necessarily profitable, thanks to a wide variety of
pro-active and reactive redeployment measures. Workers accept this flexibility in exchange for
employment security. As shown in Figure 2, low unemployment contributes to low inequality
without high public spending.
Three-generation families play a similar role in all East Asian countries by pooling income between
workers and economically inactive people. Moreover, the relatively low financial commitment of
the state in personal social services rests upon the assumption that women remain the major
providers of personal care for children and the elderly at home.
However, these forms of enterprise and family welfare are currently being challenged. Japan is still
in the midst of her longest recession since World War II and many observers believe that enterprises
will not be able to avoid massive layoffs any longer. In Korea, the recent financial crisis has already
boosted the unemployment rate to European levels. As to personal care, Japan is confronted by the
vicious circle of three intertwined trends: family nuclearisation, rising female employment and
falling fertility. The former two imply a decreased readiness of women to care for their parents or
children, the latter accelerates the ageing of the population and increases the need for care. Those
crises of family and enterprise welfare are likely to lead to increased public spending and income
inequality.
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